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Abstract
This paper presents a game-theoretic analysis of multimarket competition with strategic
capacity investments, motivated by recent developments in international natural gas markets.
It studies the competitive implications of heterogeneity in rm structure arising from asset
specicity. A single-market focus confers advantage even in the absence of superior value
or cost. Lower costs and a sharper organizational focus are self-enforcing in generating
competitive advantage. This establishes a novel connection between two of Porters generic
strategies. The model speaks to competition between pipeline gas and liqueed natural gas
(LNG) and the global impacts of the Fukushima nuclear accident.
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1 Introduction
A long tradition in industrial-organization economics examines the impact of strategic com-
mitment on market outcomes. In the classic Stackelberg model, for example, the underlying
mechanism comes as a rst-mover advantage. This paper shows how a similar commitment can
be achieved via a form of asset specicity(Williamson, 1985) that binds an individual seller,
but not all of its rivals, to a particular market. It draws out the implications for core themes in
strategy: the intensity of rivalry between rms, di¤erent routes to achieve competitive advan-
tage and their interaction, as well as the degree of value capture across di¤erent markets. In
developing these results, the paper highlights a connection which appears under-appreciated
in existing research between the literature on the sources and consequences of asset specicity
and that on competition with strategic commitment.
The analysis is motivated by recent developments in international natural gas. This industry
features two types of sellers: on one hand, traditional sellers of gas that is transported by
pipeline, such as Russia and Norway; on the other hand, exporters of seaborne liqueed natural
gas (LNG), such as Qatar, Australia and Nigeria. Following the expansion of international trade
over the 10 years, pipeline gas and LNG now increasingly compete head-to-head, notably in the
European market. But they are also fundamentally di¤erent. Gas pipelines are large investments
with a very high degree of asset specicity: once built, they are physically bound to a particular
route, with no alternative use (Makholm, 2012). LNG, by contrast, is transported by tanker,
which gives exporters a choice of markets for any given cargo. Put simply: LNG is mobile,
pipelines are not. The Fukushima Daiichi accident of March 2011, probably the largest single
event in energy markets over the last decade, highlighted the ability of exible LNG supplies to
ll the gapin Japans energy mix after its nuclear shutdown. This paper analyzes how such
a di¤erence in organizational structures a¤ects the competitive playing eld between rms.
The global gas market lends itself to such an analysis for several reasons. First, there
is little doubt that the interaction between the major players is of a highly strategic nature.
There is signicant sell-side concentration in natural gas, and its regional fragmentation into
US, European and Asian markets, with widely varying prices is, at least in part, driven by
imperfect competition (Ritz, 2014). Gas infrastructure investments are observed by market
participants and largely irreversible; this gives them substantial commitment value (Ghemawat,
1991). In this way, these markets are well-suited to the toolkit of game theory.
Second, the signicant commercial and public-policy interest in natural gas mean that un-
derstanding the industry has some merit in its own right. The shale gas revolutionhas had
large impacts on the US economy and across energy markets; the US itself looks set to become
a signicant LNG player over the coming years, with Cheniere Energys US$5 billion export fa-
cility at Sabine Pass due to come online in early 2016. Russia and China agreed the biggest-ever
deal in the history of natural gas in May 2014, worth US$400 billion over 30 years, to construct
a pipeline connection from Siberia to China. Many policy analysts and energy companies also
see an important role for natural gas in the transition to a low-carbon economy.1
1The natural gas industry is also under-researched in the academic literature. While economists have been
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Section 2 provides a detailed overview of global gas markets.
Section 3 presents a stylized model with two rms and two markets, A and B. A multimarket
rm sells to both markets while the other rm, due to the specicity of its production technology,
serves only market B. The model is a two-stage game of capacity investments followed by
quantity competition (with simultaneous choices). A key feature is that the multimarket rm
chooses how to deploy its capacity across the two markets in the second stage. This creates a
supply-side link and yields an analysis of how local shocks spill over from one market into
another. Section 4 solves for the equilibrium.
There are two main sets of results. First, asset specicity confers a strategic advantage on
the single-market rm in the common market B (Section 5). Why? The multimarket rms
optimal strategy in stage 2 equalizes marginal revenues across its two markets. Recognizing
this, the focusedrm strategically overinvests in capacity (and achieves higher market share)
in their common market, thus depressing the local price, knowing that its rival can employ its
capacity elsewhere. The magnitude of this strategic e¤ect also depends on the multimarket
players ability to capture value in its other market A.
Di¤erent strands of the strategy literature think of a rms competitive advantage as derived
from its lower cost and/or higher value to buyers (e.g., Porter, 1985; Petaraf, 1993; Branden-
burger and Stuart, 1996). Yet a focused rm can here enjoy a competitive advantage purely due
to heterogeneity in organizational structures, that is, without superior costs or value. Moreover,
a single-market focus and a cost advantage are complementary: its competitive advantage is
supermodular in its cost advantage and the strategic e¤ect.2 So a focused rms competitive
advantage arising from superior costs is greater in the presence of the multimarket e¤ect than
without. That is, the asset specicity of its investment helps this rm exploit a cost advantage.
These results speak to two of Porters (1980) three generic strategies: cost leadershipand
focus. In the model, both of these individually generate competitive advantage. Yet their
interaction di¤ers from Porters mechanism: The strategy rests on the premise that the rm is
thus able to serve its narrow strategic target more ... e¢ ciently than competitors ... as a result
the rm achieves lower costs (p. 38). By contrast, a focused strategy here allows for a given
cost advantage to be better exploited without itself leading to any (further) cost reduction.
The second set of results is motivated by the Fukushima accident: how does a demand
boom in market A (Asia) a¤ect market B (Europe)? Section 6 examines both short-term
impacts when rms capacity levels are xed and longer-term e¤ects when rms can re-
optimize capacity levels in light of changes in market conditions. Long-term impacts are driven
by changes in the magnitude of the strategic e¤ect that links the two markets. If the multimarket
rm already has strong pricing power in market A, and the local demand boom enhances its
ability to capture value, then this mitigates its strategic weakness due to multimarket exposure.
inuential in the analysis and design of liberalized electricity markets, and there is a substantial literature on the
inuence of OPEC on market performance in crude oil, there is much less on natural gas and especially little
speaking to recent events. This paper attempts to ll some of these gaps.
2The basic denition is that a function g is supermodular if g(inf(x; y)) + g(sup(x; y))  g(x) + g(y) for all
x; y. This paper works with a di¤erentiable case, for which (strict) supermodularity boils down to a positive
cross-partial derivative, i.e., gxy > 0.
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Thus a demand boom in market A has the knock-on e¤ect of making it a stronger competitor
in market B. By contrast, in the short run, raising sales to market A for the multimarket rm
means cutting those to market B, so its position there declines. A general point is that outcomes
in market B cannot be fully understood without considering market A.
This paper analyses value capture in market A in terms of the rate of pass-through from
marginal cost to price. High value capture is formally equivalent to a low pass-through rate;
intuitively, the rm then has substantial pricing power because the market price tracks buyers
willingness-to-pay more than it resembles costs. Pass-through provides a useful way to think
about competitive interactions and the division of gains from trade in a way that has not been
recognized in the strategy literature. Perhaps closest are Besanko, Dranove and Shanley (2001)
who estimate the elasticity of pass-through (i.e., %P=%MC rather than P=MC) and
relate this to product di¤erentiation, capacity utilization, and a rms relative cost position.
The stylized model captures key elements of international trade in natural gas markets. The
single-market rm is Russia which exports pipeline gas solely to the European market, and
the multimarket rm is Qatar, the worlds largest LNG exporter, which serves both European
and Asian buyers.3 Section 7 applies the results: the strategic advantage of pipeline gas over
multimarket LNG; implications for energy-policy discussions around security of supply; and
the wider impacts of the Fukushima accident. The paper argues that the above conditions
for long-term impacts are likely satised in global gas, with Fukushima inducing new LNG
investment projects and over time making LNG a stronger competitor to Gazprom in Europe.
Section 8 presents conclusions. Proofs are in the Appendix.
Further applications of the results. The combination of multimarket contact and strategic
investment can run counter to a fundamental result from the theory of imperfect competition.
In standard models (such as Cournot, Bertrand, Hotelling, etc.), a more e¢ cient rm always
has higher market share and prots. Yet a focused rm can here be more protable than a
multimarket rival despite much higher costs. Di¤erences in rm structure can dominate those
due to cost e¢ ciency. In contrast to the mutual forbearanceview and the classic repeated-
game analysis of Bernheim and Whinston (1990), multimarket contact here tends to raise market
competitiveness rather than facilitating tacit collusion.
While this paper emphasizes investments in physical capacity, a similar role can be taken
on by other strategic choices preceding product-market interaction that (i) determine a rms
subsequent scale of operation and (ii) can be deployed across markets (to varying degrees). This
includes the volume of loan commitments a rm obtains from its banks or the hiring of employees.
For example, large management consultancies like BCG or McKinsey operate across a range of
geographic, industry, and functional practices. They frequently deploy individual consultants
on projects outside their home country and/or to di¤erent client sectors. That is, they to some
degree treat their consulting capacity as global. By contrast, boutique competitors often
only serve a particular sector in their domestic market, with human-capital investments that are
3This paper follows the gas-market literature in treating countries as players; there is often a close association
with a company, e.g., Russia (Gazprom), Norway (Statoil), Algeria (Sonatrach), Qatar (Qatargas).
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specic to this business area.
The results have a similar avour to the corporate-nance literature on the diversication
discountapplied to conglomerate rms by stock-market investors (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Campa
and Kedia, 2002; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2015). One leading explanation for the discount
is that multi-business rms are susceptible to wasteful rent-seeking by individual divisions who
try to gain additional funding from corporate HQ which chooses how to allocate funds across
divisions (Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Similarly, the disadvantage of diversied rms
here arises because headquarterschooses how to allocate production capacity across markets
which can be inuenced by rivalscompetitive moves. The results here also suggest that the
discount may vary with the business cycle, and be larger during periods of market decline.
Another industry application is to airline markets. Consider the case of Frontier Airlines in
the 1980s, as described by Bulow, Geneakoplos and Klemperer (1985). Frontier had diversied
into new markets away from its original Denver hub. Following this, other airlines began to
compete more aggressively in the Denver market. The present analysis o¤ers an explanation:
diversication gave Frontier a choice of where to deploy its airline eet, allowing its competitors
to expand by gaining a Stackelberg-type position at Denver. (This holds unless Frontier was
able to appropriate all value in new markets, which is unlikely.) More generally, the model gives
a reason for why focused new entrants, especially low-cost carriers (LCCs) such as Southwest
Airlines, enjoyed a strategic advantage over large incumbent airlines (e.g, Porter, 1996).
Other related literature. This paper relates to multiple strands of literature, spanning busi-
ness strategy, industrial organization, and energy economics. The pass-through perspective on
value capture is distinct from prominent value-based models in the strategy literature beginning
with Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) and recently reviewed by Gans and Ryall (2015). These
employ coalitional games, usually solved for a small number of buyers and sellers, to study how
value creation and appropriation vary with industry primitives. Chatain and Zemsky (2011)
introduce frictions into a value-based model which lead to some suppliers being linked to
more buyers than rivals, that is, heterogeneity in rm structure albeit of a di¤erent kind to
the present paper.
This paper also relates to the earlier resource-based theory (Wernerfelt, 1984; Petaraf, 1993)
on the sources of sustainable competitive advantage: in the application to gas, for example,
the geographic location, physical properties and resulting cost structure of individual players
natural resource endowments are necessarily unique and as such not imitable by others.
A large economics literature related to asset specicity mostly focuses on vertical relations
and the make or buydecision but says little about competition between rms (Williamson,
1985; Bresnahan and Levin, 2012). A large game-theoretic literature on strategic commitment,
beginning with Spence (1977) and Dixit (1980) on investment and entry deterrence, is well-
reviewed by Vives (2000); the classic reference in the strategy literature is Ghemawat (1991).
This paper is in line with Bresnahan and Levins call for more research on the interface between
industrial organization and organizational economics. Its main focus on large infrastructure in-
vestments in the gas industry means that concerns about the fragility of commitment(Morgan
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and Várdy, 2013) are probably less pronounced than in other applications.
A smaller number of papers emphasizes supply-side links between otherwise distinct markets;
the classic reference is Bulow, Geneakoplos and Klemperer (1985). In another early paper,
Cooper (1989) uses a price-setting model of spatial competition to show how a straddlingrm
which sells to two markets can intensify competition in both. The model presented here builds
on and extends parts of Shelegia (2012), who emphasizes how competition between two rms in
a given market can be inuenced by a third rm competing in another market. Compared to the
present paper, key di¤erences are that (i) rms here are heterogeneous in terms of production
as well as investment costs (e.g., piped gas vs LNG), and (ii) demand conditions are allowed to
vary across markets (e.g., Asia vs Europe). Both of these features are crucial to the application
to global gas markets, in terms of being able to (i) adequately represent the di¤erent production
technologies and (ii) analyze the competitive implications of a regional demand shock.4
The present paper joins a small but growing literature addressing particular aspects of com-
petition in gas markets. Ritz (2014) shows that regional gas price di¤erentials are inconsistent
with models of perfect competition but can be rationalized by incorporating the market power
of large LNG exporters such as Qatar. Hawk, Pacheco-de-Almeida and Yeung (2013) examine
entry strategies into the then-emerging LNG market over the period from 1996 to 2007. They
also emphasize the commitment role of LNG investments, and nd that rms with superior
speed capabilities can a¤ord later entry dates. Growitsch, Hecking and Panke (2014) simulate a
large global gas model to explore the impact of a hypothetical blockage of LNG tankers in the
Strait of Hormuz. Their analysis also incorporates supply-side concentration and the regional
transmission of shocks. Taking a di¤erent approach, based on cooperative game theory, Hubert
and Ikonnikova (2011) analyze the power structure in the Russian pipeline network, focusing on
the balance between Russia and transit countries such as Belarus and Ukraine, while Ikonnikova
and Zwart (2014) examine the potential role of trade quotas in enhancing countervailing power
in EU natural gas markets. Their approach has the advantage akin to that of value-based
strategy theory of incorporating the bargaining power of both (large) sellers and buyers.
Finally, this paper takes a di¤erent approach to the bulk of the existing literature on natural
gas markets, which is dominated by a small number of large-scale numerical models (which
mostly also have Cournot-style setups). A representative but non-exhaustive list includes Egging,
Gabriel, Holz and Zhuang (2008), Holz, von Hirschhausen and Kemfert (2008), and Chyong and
Hobbs (2014). These are well-suited to policy analysis via numerical simulation of scenarios
in terms of gas demand, investment volumes, etc. However, their complexity means that it
can be di¢ cult to understand what is driving the numbers. This paper instead emphasizes the
microeconomic intuition and strategic interaction between key producers.5
4 In examining how local shocks spill over to other markets, this paper relates to a growing literature on net-
workedmarkets. There has recently been a renewed interest in how production networks lead to the propagation
of shocks around a system (Bimpikis, Ehsaniy and Ilkiliç, 2014; Carvalho, 2014). An oft-cited example is the
Fukushima accident, with its repercussions for global supply chains in automotives and electronics, amongst oth-
ers. While the modelling approaches are di¤erent, the underlying economic issues are closely related to those
considered here. See also Elliott (2014) for a related network model which focuses on relationship-specic invest-
ments between trading partners.
5A disadvantage of the present approach is that it yields only comparative-statics results rather than realistic-
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2 Competition and international trade in natural gas markets
This section gives further background on salient features of international competition in natural
gas markets, in particular: (1) the presence of distinct regional markets Asia, Europe and the
US with large inter-regional price di¤erentials, (2) the co-existence of two di¤erent production
technologies pipeline gas and LNG which compete head-to-head especially in the European
market, and (3) signicant market concentration amongst gas sellers, lead by Russia (pipeline
gas) and Qatar (LNG) as the two largest producers.
Production technologies. There are two technologies for the transport and sale of natural gas:
international trade is around 70% by pipeline and 30% as LNG.6 For piped gas, exploration,
development and production are followed by pipeline transportation, which usually but not
always takes place onshore. LNG involves the liquefaction of natural gas at very low temperature
in preparation for shipping on dedicated LNG tankers before regasication at the receiving
import terminal. All parts of this chain require capital investment in the millions or even billions
of dollars, and ongoing maintenance expenditure also plays an important role. Nonetheless, both
technologies ultimately lead to a homogeneous product with identical end-uses on the buyer side,
for example, in industrial production and residential heating.
From a cost perspective, pipeline connections to end-consumer markets are preferable for
short-to-medium medium distances while LNG is more economical for longer distances (Jensen,
2004). Thus, for a given consumer market served by both producer types, the LNG imports tend
to come from further away with higher transportation costs. Yet connecting to this market by
pipeline was too costly or technologically infeasible for the LNG seller(s); due to its geographic
location, it cannot imitatethe pipeline setup. Crudely put, it makes no sense to build a gas
pipeline from the US to Spain.
Regional markets. Global gas trade takes place in regionally fragmented markets. As shown
in Figure 1, average gas/LNG prices in 2013 were around US$17 per million metric British
thermal units in Asia (Japan and South Korea), US$11/MMBtu in Europe (UK and Germany),
and US$4 in the US (at Henry Hub, the leading US gas trading hub located in Louisiana).
Signicant price di¤erentials apparent departures from the law of one price have persisted
for many years. Over 1992 to 2014, the average Asian premiumover European gas prices was
over 36%; it was negative for a relatively short period in 2008/9, then rising again following the
Fuskuhima accident of March 2011.7
The US is now the worlds largest gas producer but is disconnected from international trade
apart from pipeline trade with Canada given its well-publicized current lack of LNG export
looking numbers of the global gas market as a whole. Another di¤erence is that existing large-scale models are
typically mixed complementarity problemssolved as open loopequilibria, in which capacity and production
decisions are, in e¤ect, made simultaneously; the analysis here instead derives a closed loop equilibrium in
which rmscapacity decisions have a strategic impact on subsequent play.
6The trade data described in this section are from BP (2014).
7Li, Joyeux and Ripple (2014) also nd that the world gas market is not integrated but do nd integration
between European and Asian markets; part of the reason is likely that their dataset ends in May 2011 and
therefore contains almost no after-e¤ects of Fukushima.
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Figure 1: Global gas prices over 1992 to 2014 in US$/MMBtu (Source: IMF)
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infrastructure (Joskow, 2013). As a result, the shale gas boom has reduced domestic US natural
gas prices, with signicant distributional impacts, but not those in higher-price overseas markets
(Hausman and Kellogg, 2015).
Industry structure. There is signicant market concentration amongst international gas pro-
ducers, with Russia and Qatar as the two major players together accounting for 35% of in-
ternational trade (outside North America). Russia is the worlds 2nd largest producer of gas
and its largest exporter, with Gazprom controlling around 75% of production and holding a
legal monopoly over exports of piped gas. Of its pipeline exports, over 80% go to European
markets while the remainder goes to countries of the former Soviet Union, some of which also
perform a transit role. Russias share of international pipeline trade (outside North America)
is around 35%; other large pipeline producers are Norway (17%), the Netherlands (8%), and
Algeria (4%) which all also serve the European market.8
On the LNG side, Qatar is the worlds largest exporter with a global LNG market share
of almost 35%. Its largest LNG destinations are both mid-priceEurope (especially UK and
Italy) and high-priceAsia (especially Japan and South Korea), with a split of around 25%
and 75%. The next largest LNG exporters are Nigeria, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Trinidad & Tobago which all have market shares in the range of 6% to 11%. In addition to
Qatar, multimarket LNG exporters serving both Europe and Asia include Nigeria, Trinidad
& Tobago, and Peru.
From the European viewpoint, around 80% of total gas imports are by pipeline and 20%
as LNG. Around 40% of Europes total gas consumption is met via Russian pipelines, and the
majority of imports come from Russia. This import dependency on Russia has been the source of
8Russia also has a small presence in LNG at less than 5% of its total gas sales. But this LNG is based out
of di¤erent gas elds than its pipeline sales to Europe, so in e¤ect represents a di¤erent actor to the main one
considered in this paper. Incorporating this in the model would not alter any of the insights presented in what
follows; see Section 5 for related discussion.
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political and economic concerns about security of supply. LNG plays a particularly important
role for the UK, Italy, and Spain (for which LNG imports can exceed pipeline trade), and close
to 50% of European LNG imports come from Qatar.
By contrast, many Asian countries rely heavily on LNG imports given their lack of domestic
resources and pipeline infrastructure (with the main exception of China); LNG makes up 100%
of Japanese and South Korean gas imports, and Japan is the worlds largest LNG importer,
with Qatar as its top supplier.
Price drivers. What are the drivers of the international price di¤erences, notably between
Asia and Europe? There are several potential reasons, only one of which is well-supported by
the data. First, di¤erences in transport costs across export markets can rationalize di¤erent
prices even under perfect competition. The problem is that price di¤erentials in many cases
have far exceeded any such cost di¤erences; Qatari LNGs transport costs to Asia and Europe
are very similar because the shipping distances are similar. In some cases, routes with higher
transport costs have lower prices (Ritz, 2014).
Second, binding capacity constraints at LNG import terminals, which result in import de-
mand exceeding capacity, could make the local gas price rise above marginal cost. If the strength
of this e¤ect varies across markets, then it could rationalize price di¤erences. The problem is
that the import capacity utilization rate has been stable at only around 40% globally since 2000;
even in post-Fukushima Japan, regasication terminal utilization only rose to 49%, and there
are almost no countries in which these constraints are even close to binding (IGU, 2013).
Third, price di¤erences could be the result of third-degree price discrimination by LNG
exporters, which exploits di¤erences in price elasticities of demand across regions. Demand is
likely less elastic in Asia than in Europe because of more limited substitution possibilities (e.g.,
to pipeline gas). This was likely exacerbated by the Fukushima accident, which led to a sharp
rise in Japans willingness-to-pay for gas. Ritz (2014) shows that exporter market power can
rationalize observed prices and trade patterns, combined with limited access to the LNG tanker
market which makes it di¢ cult for third-party traders to (fully) arbitrage prices.
In short, competition in global gas markets is far from perfect. The model laid out in the
following section captures these key features; the application of the modelling results to global
gas is presented in Section 7.
3 Setup of the model
Firm 1 sells to both markets, A and B, with outputs denoted by x1; y1. Firm 2 can sell only
into market B, with sales of y2.
On the demand side, market B features homogeneous products via an linear inverse demand
pB(y1; y2) =    (y1 + y2) with parameters ;  > 0. Market A has a general demand curve
pA(x1); let A   x1pAxx=pAx denote a coe¢ cient of its curvature. (So demand in market A
is concave if A < 0 () pAxx < 0, and convex otherwise.) Direct demand is assumed to be
log-concave, A < 1 (Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005). This is a common assumption in models
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of imperfect competition which ensures that second-order conditions are satised. Competition
between rms is therefore in strategic substitutes (Bulow, Geneakoplos and Klemperer, 1985).
The game has two stages. In the rst stage, rms simultaneously invest in production
capacities, K1 and K2, respectively at unit costs of capacity r1 > 0 and r2 > 0. Note that rm
1 can deploy its capacity in both markets, while rm 2s investment is specic to market B. In
the second stage, rms simultaneously decide how much output to sell into markets A and B,
at unit costs of production c1  0 and c2  0, subject to their installed production capacities.
These unit costs of production are interpreted as including transportation costs. Choices are
observable to players, and there is no discounting.
Firms maximize their respective prots and the equilibrium concept is subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium. Assume throughout that demand and cost conditions are such that both rms are
active in equilibrium, selling positive amounts to their respective markets; standing assumptions
are  > rj+cj for j = 1; 2, cj < 12(+ci) for j 6= i, pA(0) > r1+c1 and pA(x1) < 0 at su¢ ciently
high x1. Also assume that both producers sell up to capacity in Stage 2.9 Conditions on
parameter values which ensure these assumptions are met in equilibrium are given in Lemma 1.
4 Solving the model
Dene rmsrevenue functions across the two markets, RA1 (x1) = p
Ax1 and RB1 (y1; y2) = p
By1,
RB2 (y1; y2) = p
By2. Also dene the corresponding marginal revenues MRA1 (x1) =
@
@x1
 
pAx1

=
pA + pAx x1 and MR
B
1 (y1; y2) =
@
@y1
 
pBy1

= pB   y1, MRB2 (y1; y2) = @@y2
 
pBy2

= pB   y2.
4.1 Stage 2: Output decisions
Consider rmsoutput choices in Stage 2, given the capacity investments of Stage 1. By as-
sumption, producers are capacity-constrained, implying that rm 1s sales satisfy x1 + y1 = K1,
while y2 = K2 for rm 2. The main question at this stage, therefore, is how rm 1 splits its
sales across markets.
Clearly, rm 1 maximizes its prots by equating the contribution at the margin of each
market. That is, it chooses a sales strategy (x1; y1) that equalizes marginal revenue, net of the
short-run marginal cost of production, for each market: MRA1 (x1)  c1 = MRB1 (y1; y2)  c1 ()
MRA1 (x1) = MR
B
1 (y1; y2). Since the rms are capacity-constrained, the equilibrium condition
can be rewritten in terms of capacities:
MRA1 (K1   y1) = MRB1 (y1;K2): (1)
Firm 1s choice of output to market B thus depends on the capacity installed by its rival, rm
2. This plays a crucial role, and is examined more closely, in what follows. By contrast, for
rm 2, y2 = K2, irrespective of rm 1s actions. The key di¤erence is that, having sunk their
9The assumption that producers are capacity-constrained simplies the analysis considerably. In e¤ect, it
reduces the dimensionality of the problem from ve choice variables (two capacity choices plus three output
choices) to three.
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investments, rm 1 has an alternative use for its capacity while rm 2 does not.
To summarize, given capacities K = (K1;K2), rmsoutput choices are x1(K), y1(K), and
y2(K) = K2.
4.2 Stage 1: Capacity decisions
Anticipating these output decisions, consider rmsdecisions to invest in capacity at Stage 1.
Firm 1 chooses its investment to maximize its joint prots from both markets:
max
K1

RA1 (x1(K)) +R
B
1 (y1(K); y2(K))  r1K1   c1[x1(K) + y1(K)
	
;
which makes explicit the indirect dependency of its revenues and production costs on both rms
capacity choices. The rst-order condition is:
0 = MRA1
@x1
@K1
+MRB1
@y1
@K1
  r1   c1

@x1
@K1
+
@y1
@K1

: (2)
This condition can be simplied. First, since the rm is capacity-constrained, @x1=@K1 +
@y1=@K1 = 1; in other words, total sales across both markets rise one-for-one with capacity.
Second, from (1), the rm equates marginal revenue across markets, MRA1 = MR
B
1 . So the
multi-market rm invests in capacity such that
MRA1 = MR
B
1 = r1 + c1; (3)
where the right-hand side is its combined unit cost of capacity and production, i.e., its long-run
marginal cost. Thus the outcome in market A is the monopoly price given marginal cost r1+ c1.
Denoting the associated monopoly output by xm, it follows that x1 = xm, and so y1 = K1 xm.
Firm 2 chooses its capacity investment to:
max
K2

RB2 (y1(K); y2(K))  r2K2   c2y2(K)
	
The rst-order condition is:
0 = MRB2
@y2
@K2
+
@RB2
@y1
@y1
@K2
  r2   c2 @y2
@K2
: (4)
Analogously to the previous rm, @y2=@K2 = 1, due to the binding capacity constraint. Note
also @RB2 =@y1 =  y2 given the linear demand structure of market B. Dene the strategic e¤ect
connecting markets   ( @y1=@K2). Thus simplifying the rst-order condition gives:
MRB2 + y2 = r2 + c2: (5)
Firm 2 recognizes that its capacity choice a¤ects the product-market behaviour of rm 1 in
their common market B. Totally di¤erentiating the equal-marginal-revenues condition from (1)
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shows that the strategic e¤ect satises:
 

  @y1
@K2

=
@MRA1
@K2
  @MRB1@K2
@MRA1
@y1
  @MRB1@y1
=
"

2 + ( pAx )
 
2  A
#
2 (0; 12): (6)
Observe that
  pAx   2  A is the absolute value of the slope of the marginal revenue curve of
rm 1 in market A,
 @@x1MRA1 .10 The strategic e¤ect captures how strongly rm 2 can induce
rm 1 to cut back output in market B; this raises the marginal return to rm 2 of installing an
additional unit of capacity and so, in equilibrium, MRB2 < r2 + c2.
4.3 Summary of the equilibrium
Firm 1s output in market A is at the monopoly level, x1 = xm. By assumption rm 2 sells up
to capacity, y2 = K2, and rm 1 uses all of its capacity across markets, K1 = xm + y1. So only
two unknowns are left: y1 and K2.
The following result gives the equilibrium values ( bK; bx1; by1; by2), together with a parameter
condition which ensures that the equilibrium, (i) is an interior solution with strictly positive
outputs to each market, and (ii) it is optimal for each rm to produce up to installed capacity.
Lemma 1. Suppose the following condition on parameter values holds:
(r1 + c1) 2
 
[2 (r2 + c2)  ] ;min

1
3 [+ 2 (r2 + c2)] ; [2 (3r2 + c2)  ]
	
:
The equilibrium in rmscapacity investments and production volumes is given by:bx1 = xmby1 = [(2  ) (  r1   c1)  (  r2   c2)] =(3  2)bK1 = bx1 + by1bK2 = by2 = [2 (  r2   c2)  (  r1   c1)] =(3  2)
where xm solves MRA1 (xm) = r1 + c1, and the equilibrium value of the strategic e¤ect satises
 =
"

2 + ( pAx )
 
2  A
#
x1=bx1
:
The parameter condition in terms of rm 1s long-run marginal cost, r1 + c1, is su¢ cient for
the equilibrium to obtain as described in Lemma 1. It is stated in a way that is independent
of the value of the strategic e¤ect  2 (0; 12). Importantly, therefore, this condition does not
depend on the details of the equilibrium in market A; it varies only with the rmsmarginal
10The nal equality uses that @MRA1 =@K2 = 0 (rm 2s actions have no direct impact on revenues in market
A), @MRB1 =@K2 = @MR
B
1 =@y2, @MR
A
1 =@y1 =  @MRA1 =@x1, as well as the denition of demand curvature
A   x1pAxx=pAx . To understand the expression, note that a small increase dK2 > 0 lowers 1s marginal revenue
in market B by dMRB1 = (@MR
B
1 =@y2)(dK2) =  (dK2) < 0. By how much does y1 need to adjust to
restore optimality? Cutting y1 both raises MRB1 and lowers MR
A
1 ; specically, dMR
B
1 =  2(dy1) > 0 and
dMRA1 =
  pAx   2  A (dy1) < 0, thus leading to the expression for .
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costs and the state of demand in market B. Later on, this will facilitate the analysis of the
cross-market impacts of changes in A on B.11
Equilibrium prices follow as bpA = pA(bx1) and bpB =   (by1 + by2). The standard Cournot-
Nash equilibrium (for output choices in stage 2) is nested where   0.
5 The strategic advantage of asset specicity
The rst main insight is that a rm which is focused on a single market enjoys a strategic advan-
tage in that market. The reason is the presence of the strategic e¤ect: rm 2 has an incentive
to overexpand capacity and sales to market B, recognizing that its multimarket competitor has
an alternative use for its capacity in market A, so it can induce rm 1 to cede market share in
stage 2. This e¤ect operates in an asymmetric fashion since rm 2 due to the specicity of its
investment has no such outside option.
It will be useful to introduce two more denitions. First, let the relative market share of
rm i in market B, i  byi=byj , be a measure of the competitive playing eld; specically, rm
i is said to have a competitive advantage over its rival j if and only if i > 1. Second, rm js
value-added in market B is 'j  (  rj   cj) for j = 1; 2. This is the (maximum) willingness-
to-pay of consumers in market B minus rm js unit cost; more value-added here corresponds
to lower cost. Under Cournot-Nash competition (  0), these two concepts are tightly related:
rm i has a competitive advantage if and only if it has higher value-added than its rival j. In
the present model, there is a richer set of results:
Proposition 1. The single-market rm 2 can have a competitive advantage despite higher costs
('2 < '1); specically, it has a competitive advantage over its multimarket rival rm 1 in
market B, 2 > 1, if and only if ('1   '2) ='1 < =3.
Strategic considerations enable rm 2 to take on a quasi-Stackelberg role. The di¤erence is
that rms here make choices simultaneously rather than sequentially, so the advantage is due
to the asymmetry in organizational structure rather than an asynchronous timing of moves. In
contrast to much of the literature on strategic commitment, neither rm is the incumbentand
there is no rst-mover advantage. In the strategy literature, a rms competitive advantage is
usually seen as arising from higher value and/or lower cost; here it can arise purely because of
heterogeneity in rm structure. In the present model, with symmetric value-addeds, '1 = '2,
rm 2s has a competitive advantage with 2 = 1=(1  ) 2 (1; 2).
These e¤ects of multimarket interaction can run counter to a fundamental result from
oligopoly theory, namely that high market share goes hand in hand with low marginal cost
11To see that this leaves room for manoeuvre in terms of parameter values, consider the special case where both
rms have an identical cost structure with c1 = c2 = c and r1 = r2 = r. The three individual conditions then
collapse into two, and become r 2   1
5
(  c) ; (  c). In this setting, r + c <  is always satised since there
would otherwise be no gains from trade in market B. Intuitively, the requirement that r > 1
5
(  c) ensures
that the unit cost of capacity is su¢ ciently high such the rmsdo not install too much capacity and thus end
up using all of it. To see another example, let  = 1 with zero production costs cj = 0 for j = 1; 2. Then the
condition becomes r1 2
 
2r2   1;min

1
3
(2r2 + 1); 6r2   1
	
, and it is easy to check that there is a substantial set
of values for r1; r2 which satises this. For instance, if r2 = 14 , then any r1 2 (0; 12 ) works.
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(i.e., rmsmarket shares and e¢ ciency levels are co-monotonic). This applies in all common
(single-market) oligopoly models, including Cournot (quantity) and Bertrand (price) competi-
tion, as well as spatial competition models such as Hotelling, and the supply-function equilibrium
models often used to analyze electricity markets (Vives, 2000).
In the present model, by contrast, rm 2 can have a competitive advantage even if it has
much higher costs. To illustrate, let the demand parameter  = 30, rm 2s marginal cost
r2 = 5 and c2 = 5, so (r2 + c2) = 10, and the equilibrium value of the strategic e¤ect  = 13 .
(Note from Lemma 1 that it is possible to obtain any  2 (0; 12) by appropriate choice of .)
Then, whenever rm 1s long-run marginal cost (r1+c1) 2 (712 ; 10), rm 2 retains a higher share
of market B. So its cost can be over 30% higher than that of the multimarket rm.12 (The
parameter condition of Lemma 1 is satised for these values.)
Proposition 1 has implications for making inferences on rmse¢ ciency levels from observed
market performance. Suppose an industry analyst observed that rms 1 and 2 have identical
market shares of market B. Guided by standard models of competition, and in the absence
of any other discernible di¤erences within market B, the natural conclusion is that both rms
therefore have identical productivity levels. Yet this inference can be misleading if at least one
of the rms also competes in another market; rmsperformance can be the same (by1 = by2)
even if their value-addeds are not ('1 6= '2).
The next result pins down the comparative statics of the strategic e¤ect:
Proposition 2. In market B, in the single-market rm 2s market share and prots rise with
the strategic e¤ect , while the price and the multimarket rm 1s prots fall. The Herndahl
index rises with the strategic e¤ect  if and only if rm 2 has a competitive advantage, 2 > 1.
A stronger multimarket e¤ect shifts market share and prots from the multimarket rm 1
to the focused rm 2. At the same time, the greater intensity of rivalry raises total output and
lowers the equilibrium price in market B, similar to the usual Stackelberg model. As long as
rm 2 has a competitive advantage, i.e., a larger market share, to begin with, this also pushes
up the Herndahl index (i.e., the sum of squared market shares). Note that higher industry
concentration is good news for consumers in this setting.
The next result is on the interaction of the strategic e¤ect and competitive advantage:
Proposition 3. The single-market rm 2s relative share of market B, 2, is supermodular in
its relative value-added '2='1 and the strategic e¤ect .
In other words, the two e¤ects are self-enforcing: greater value-added and a stronger strategic
e¤ect both individually raise rm 2s market share, but they also raise each others marginal
12After completing the working-paper version, I became aware of Arie et al. (2015) who study how a strategic-
commitment perspective on multimarket contact di¤ers from the usual tacit-collusion (mutual forbearance)
view, and also show that it is quantitatively signicant; the main focus of their applications is US airline markets
and merger analysis. They consider a related-but-di¤erent model with asymmetric demand conditions across
markets (which is needed for a meaningful multimarket-analysis of tacit collusion) but, unlike the present paper,
assume that rms have identical cost structures (which is problematic in the context of global gas, but perhaps
less so for airlines).
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impacts on competitive advantage. This has a number of implications, notably that rm 2s
gain in competitive advantage due to superior costs is greater in the presence of the strategic
e¤ect than in a world with  = 0; put di¤erently, the gain [2('2='1; )  2(1; )] > 0 rises
with  for any '2='1 > 1.
In this sense, a superior cost structure and a sharper organizational focus are complements
in generating competitive advantage for rm 2. The intuition is that, by Proposition 2, the
multimarket e¤ect pushes price and hence rmsprot margins down; in a more competitive
market, the benet from having lower costs than rivals is relatively greater. This establishes a
novel link between two of Porters (1980) generic strategies.
These insights seem consistent with discussions in the strategy literature on competition
between di¤erent types of companies in the airline industry. In particular, many analysts have
observed the advantage that low-cost carriers (LCCs), notably Southwest Airlines, have had in
competition against incumbent airlines originally in the US but over the last decade or so also
in Europe. Discussions typically emphasize their lower cost base but also that they are more
selective (and less burdened by history) in choosing which routes to y (e.g., Porter, 1996). The
present model suggests that these two features of their setup are not only benecial but, in fact,
also reenforcing. Such a point is arguably di¢ cult to make precise without the aid of a formal
model, and thus highlights the contribution of a game-theoretic approach.
Note that none of Propositions 13 hinge on the price di¤erence between markets A and B,
i.e., the sign or magnitude of bpA   bpB.
The analysis thus far has considered the linkage between the two markets by essentially
treating  as a parameter. Yet the strategic e¤ect is, of course, endogenous in the model; recall
from Lemma 1 that    = 2 +   pAx   2  A 2 (0; 12).
Its magnitude thus depends on two factors. The rst factor is the relative size of markets
A and B, as contained in the ratio =
  pAx . The case with  ! 0 corresponds to market B
becoming very large (relative to market A). In such situations, rm 1 nds this market very
attractive, and therefore only reluctantly redirects output away from it, and so  is small. The
case with
  pAx  very large corresponds to consumers in market A being very price-insensitive;
a small reduction in price induces little additional demand, and again  is small. In short, a
stronger strategic e¤ect is associated with the common market B being small relative to A.
The second factor relates to demand conditions in the market A, as contained in the term 
2  A. The curvature parameter A !  1, corresponds to very concave demand in market
A in the limit, all consumers have (almost) the same willingness-to-pay. This is best understood
as reecting the multimarket rms ability to capture value in its monopolized market A:
Lemma 2. The degree of value capture, at equilibrium, by the multimarket rm 1 in market
A is given by vA = 1=(1 + A), where A  dbpA=dMC = 1=(2   A) 2 (0; 1) is the rate of
pass-through from marginal cost to price.
Value capture refers to the fraction of the total value (social surplus) generated in the
market to both buyers (consumer surplus) and the rm (producer surplus) which is cap-
tured by the rm as prots. Lemma 2 shows that the last unit of output at equilibrium creates
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consumer surplus at a fraction A of extra rm prots, so the degree of value capture is given
by vA = 1=(1 + A).13 The pass-through coe¢ cient A  dbpA=dMC measures by how much
the equilibrium price responds to a change in marginal cost. Higher value capture, or pricing
power, is associated with a lower rate of cost pass-through. Intuitively, this means that the
price then tracks consumerswillingness-to-pay relatively more closely than it tracks costs. The
maintained assumption that demand is log-concave, A < 1, means that pass-through A lies
between zero and 100%. Pass-through is lower, and value capture is higher, when demand is
more concave, i.e., A is smaller.14
In the limiting case as pass-through tends to zero (A !  1), the monopolist extracts all
the available gains from the trade in market A so value capture becomes 100%; thus, there is
no distortion below the rst-bestlevel of output. In this situation, there is no scope for rm
2 to strategically inuence its decision-making, as it will not deviate from its preferred level
of output, and so  = 0. Intuitively, with such pronounced pricing power, rm 1 will be very
careful to divert additional units to market A and depress price there. By contrast, an almost
perfectly competitive seller with little market power would be almost indi¤erent to selling more
to market A, and can thus be more easily manipulated in its decision-making.
This discussion leads directly to the following summary:
Lemma 3. The strategic e¤ect  is higher if (i) market B is smaller relative to market A
(=
  pAx  is larger), or (ii) the multimarket rm 2s degree of value capture in market A is
smaller (vA = 1=(1 + A) is smaller).
This conrms that Propositions 13 are logically valid. Changes in the strategic e¤ect are
driven as per Lemma 3. The previous analysis of competitive advantage in market B did not
depend directly on  or on the details of demand conditions in market A. (Doubling  halves
the size of the market B but this leaves the rmsrelative market shares and prots unchanged;
it just acts as a scaling factor for market size.) The analysis of competitive advantage is driven
only indirectly by these factors, precisely because they alter the magnitude of the strategic e¤ect.
How robust are these results? First, the multimarket rm, even though its protability in
market B is lower than that of its rival, is not acting irrationally by operating in both markets.
It could be optimal, i.e., prot-maximizing, for both the multimarket and the single-market rm
to self-select into these respective organizational structures. For rm 1, serving both markets
A and B can easily be more protable than serving only market B, simply because the prot
contribution of A exceeds the adverse impact on prots from B. Similarly, it may be too
expensive (or impossible) for rm 2 to enter market A, e.g., due to the geographic location of
its resource base in a stage 0of the game (not explicitly modelled here).
13This result also appears, stated in a slightly di¤erent way, in Weyl and Fabinger (2013).
14The rate of pass-through has no necessary relationship with the conventional price elasticity of demand. Recall
that a monopolist facing a linear demand curve extracts 50% of the potential social surplus (with 25% left each
as consumer surplus and deadweight loss), regardless of the particular equilibrium value of the price elasticity of
demand.
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Second, the results apply also apply to the alternative denition of competition advantage
as the relative prots of the rms in market B. The condition from Proposition 1 comes out less
cleanly but it is still true that rm 2 can have higher prots despite higher costs. Proposition 2 is
unchanged, except that the result on the Herndahl index does depend on competitive advantage
being dened in terms of market share rather than prots. Proposition 3 on supermodularity
holds in exactly the same way. The remainder of the analysis is also una¤ected.
Third, to bring out the results as clearly as possible, this paper uses a very simple model with
only two rms. Yet this setup does not seem critical. For instance, if rm 1 faced a competitive
fringe of small producers in market A, it would simply act as a residual monopolist rather than
an outright monopoly. The logic of rm 2 equalizing marginal revenues across markets and
the resulting strategic vulnerability (of endogenous magnitude) remains. Or, with other single-
market producers selling to market B, all would vie to take advantage of rm 2s multimarket
exposure. More realistic market structures quickly make the model unwieldy but its main
insights appear to be generalizable.
Fourth, rmsproducts in market B are taken to be homogeneous. This could be relaxed
to allow for horizontal product di¤erentiation (e.g., di¤erent branding) by letting js demand
pBj (y1; y2) =    (yj + yi) for i 6= j and j = 1; 2, where  2 (0; 1) is an inverse measure of
di¤erentiation. This reduces the interdependence between rms and hence weakens the strategic-
substitutes property of competition. Yet the basic results still qualitatively apply as long as rms
remain competitors in this market (rather than independent monopolies as  ! 0).
Fifth, the analysis assumes that rms are prot-maximizers. This is a canonical assumption
which seems appropriate for a wide range of markets. But it is perhaps less clear to what extent
it applies when, like in the international gas industry, some actors are state-controlled entities.
These may have a preference for running a larger operation than would be prot-maximizing.
It turns out that the results are not overly sensitive to this. If players instead maximize utility
functions, the multimarket rm equalizes marginal utility across markets. As long as competition
remains in strategic substitutes, the main insights from the analysis again continue to apply; it
is more important that players maximize than what exactly is being maximized.
Sixth, the analysis raises the question of how a multimarket rm might mitigate its strategic
weakness. For example, it could, already at the investment stage, earmark specic capacity
shares to individual markets by signing long-term contracts with buyers in each market. Then
it would no longer have to (or be able to) allocate capacity between markets in stage 2; in
e¤ect, this bundles together the two stages. The strategic e¤ect can also be mitigated by way
of improving value capture in market A which is examined in detail in the following section.
The qualitative insights from the model apply as long as some capacity is not pre-allocated
in this fashion. Put di¤erently, the strategic weakness from multi-market exposure requires only
that some capacity is allocated between markets, not necessarily all installed capacity as is
formally the case in the model. Such a mix reects actual practice in a range of sectors. For
example, in the gas industry, long-term contracts play an important role but as discussed in
the introduction there are signicant exible volumes which LNG producers allocate between
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export markets.15 In other sectors like airlines or consulting, capacities are also not fully pre-
allocated to individual routes or markets at the investment stage.
6 Spillover e¤ects from a local demand shock
The analysis thus far has concentrated on the strategic advantage enjoyed by a rm which
serves fewer markets than its rivals. In practice, uncertainty over demand and costs (and rival
behaviour) can play a signicant role in driving decisions. There may be trade-o¤s between
committing to particular investments and retaining exibility to adjust decisions further down
the road (Ghemawat and del Sol, 1998).
This analysis in this section was originally motivated by the global repercussions which the
2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan had across a wide range of sectors. It explores how a
local demand shock in market A a¤ects the equilibrium in market B, and how the focused and
multimarket rms respond di¤erently, both over the short run and long run.
In particular, consider the impact of an upward shift in demand conditions in market A,
both on the equilibrium in market A itself as well as spillovers onto market B. Formally, write
demand in market A as pA(x1; ), where  is a shift parameter, and assume pA > 0 (everywhere,
for simplicity), so a higher  raises consumerswillingness-to-pay (WTP). Note that such a shift
can both change the shape of the demand curve and lead to a movement along it.
6.1 Local e¤ects on the domestic market
Before turning to the main question at hand, it is important to establish the impact of stronger
demandin market A on market A itself. However intuitive, it is not always true that a demand
shift that raises consumersWTP also raises price and output.
The following result characterizes the set of conditions under which the expected local
e¤ects prevail. Let A  d log pA =d log x1 denote the elasticity of the higher WTP with respect
to market output.
Lemma 4. (a) In market A, in equilibrium, a demand shift from 0 to 00 raises output bx1(00) >bx1(0) if and only if Z 00
0

pA (1 + 
A
 )
( pAx )(2  A)

x1=bx1 d > 0,
and raises price bpA1 (00) > bpA1 (0) if and only ifZ 00
0
 
pA

(1  A)  A

(2  A)
!
x1=bx1
d < 0.
15Contracting arrangements have also become more exible in LNG markets over the last decade. Traditionally,
investments were backed up by long-term contracts (of around 20 years duration) between a seller and buyer.
Today, trade in spot and short-term markets makes up about 30% of global LNG sales (GIIGNL, 2013). These
short-term transactions were key to the market response to the Fukushima accident. Brito and Hartley (2007)
present a model in which a shift towards spot trading has self-reenforcing properties.
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(b) A su¢ cient condition for output to rise is A >  1 for all  2 [0; 00], and a su¢ cient
condition for the price to rise is A < (1  A)=A for all  2 [0; 00].
In sum, both of the expected local e¤ects go through as long as the elasticity A is not too
large either way. In other words, the jump in WTP cannot vary too much across consumers.
These conditions are necessary and su¢ cient with a small (i.e., innitesimal) shift in demand,
and su¢ cient with a large (i.e., discrete) shift. They are always met if demand takes the form
pA =  + f(x1) so WTP rises uniformly (A  0), and more likely to be satised the lower
the rate of cost pass-through A equivalently, higher value capture vA. For output to rise, the
demand shift must not only raise WTP, pA > 0, but also raise marginal revenue,
@
@MR
A
1 > 0 if
and only if A >  1.
6.2 Global spillover e¤ects to other markets
Now turn to the main question: How does a demand shock in market A spill over to market
B? The answer will depend on the timeframe under consideration. The analysis begins with
the short-run response, in which rmsglobal capacity levels are xed. Then it examines the
longer-term response, in which rms optimally adjust capacity.
Short-term responses with xed capacities. In the short run, both rmscapacities are
xed at the levels that were optimal with respect to the initialstate of demand in market A.
So rms can only re-optimize their output choices in light of new market conditions.
For simplicity, suppose the new short-run equilibrium features interior solutions (both
rms continue serve each of their markets) and rms engage in Nash behaviour.
Proposition 4. Suppose that A >  1 for all  2 [0; 00]. In the short run, with xed capacities,
a demand boom in market A raises rm 2s market share (2) and the price in market B.
The reason for the result is as follows. The demand boom makes market A relatively more
attractive to rm 1 (see Lemma 4), making it redirect capacity from B to A (since it was already
selling up to capacity). For rm 2, there is no direct change in its demand conditions as it serves
only market B; its position changes only in that its rival sells less to market B. This, as such,
induces it to increase its own sales but this is impossible given its (already binding) capacity
constraint. So total sales to market B decline, and the local price and rm 2s market share
rise. Since overall demand conditions have improved, the rms still do best by selling up to
capacity although the spread across markets has shifted.
In terms of prots, note that rm 1 is better o¤ by revealed preference: given that A >  1,
it can achieve strictly higher prots than before by choosing to redirect some capacity toward
market A. This is an instance of the benets of exibility a¤orded by multimarket presence.
But note that the focused rm 2 also benets from the demand boom in market A even though
it is committed to not serving this market. A focused strategy does not necessarily preclude a
rm from benetting from market developments elsewhere.
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Longer-term responses with optimal capacities. In the longer term, rms can adjust
their capacity levels to be optimal given the new global market fundamentals. What, then, is
the long-run impact on market B of the demand boom in market A?
Formally, compare the equilibrium of the two-stage game, with capacity investments followed
by quantity choices, at the initial demand level 0 with that following the demand shift 00, under
the maintained assumption that rms always produce up to their respective capacities.16
From the previous discussion with optimal capacities, it follows that the only cross-market
e¤ect comes via possible changes in the magnitude of the strategic e¤ect. Writing () 
 = 2 +   pAx ()  2  A(), the issue is how changes in  a¤ect   pAx   2  A, that is,
determining the sign of dd
  pAx   2  A = dd [ slope of marginal revenue curve A].
The case with linear demand serves as a useful benchmark. If demand in market A is
everywhere linear (i.e., its curvature A = 0 for all x1), then
  pAx   2  A =  2pAx is just a
constant. (Note that then also A = 0.) In this case, the demand shift is strategically neutral,
i.e., 0() = 0 for all . As a result, the equilibrium in market B is unchanged in the long run
when rms optimally adjust capacity (and market A is a¤ected as per Lemma 4).
More generally, however, the demand shock will not be strategically neutral for market B.
The following result gives a general condition to sign its impact and simple su¢ cient conditions
for the demand shock to weaken the cross-market connection.
Proposition 5. (a) A demand boom in market A weakens the strategic e¤ect (00)  (0) if
and only if: Z 00
0
0@[pAx1  A + 2A +   pAx  ddA]
[2 + ( pAx ) (2  A)]2
1A
x1=bx1
d  0:
(b) Su¢ cient conditions for 
 
00

< 
 
0

are that, for all  2 [0; 00], cost pass-through is
su¢ ciently low, A < 12
 
1 + A
 1
, and non-increasing, dA=d  0.
The former condition is certainly met if A < 12 (if and only if demand is concave, 
A < 0) and
the impact of the demand increase on consumerswillingness-to-pay satises A  0 (if and only
if pAx  0).
Combining Propositions 3 and 5 leads directly to:
Proposition 6. In the long run, with optimal capacities, a demand boom in market A increases
price but decreases rm 2s market share in market B, under the conditions of Proposition 5.
Under these conditions, the demand boom in market A makes rm 1 less strategically vulner-
able to aggressive overexpansion by its focused competitor in their common market B. Because
competition in market B becomes less aggressive, consumers there lose out.
16The analysis does not consider a fully dynamic model in which there is a time-dependence of the capital
stock. The technique employed here can be justied on various grounds. For example, it corresponds to a setting
in which capacity depreciates after each period, so rm 1 rst invests given low demand, and then must make a
new investment given high demand. Alternatively, the setup ts the interpretation of capacity as maintenance
expenditure, which is required period by period, or as the improvement of existing capacities. Solving a fully
dynamic version of the model looks hard.
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Roughly put, the conditions are met when rm 1 already has relatively high value capture
equivalently, low pass-through in market A, and this market power tends to be further
strengthened by the demand boom. Simple su¢ cient conditions are that pass-through is less
than 50% and that this rate does not rise following the shift in demand conditions. This
is su¢ cient combined with a non-negative cross-partial on the impact of the demand shift on
buyersWTP, pAx  0. Think of this as @@x1
 
pA
  0: WTP increases for all consumers but
tends to rise more strongly for buyers who already have a higher WTP. Again, this is consistent
with the idea that the demand boom raises rm 1s ability to capture value in market A.
So, in the longer run, the multimarket rm benets twice from stronger demand in market
A. First, via the obvious direct gain in market A from more sales at a higher price. Second, and
less obviously, the demand boom in market A makes rm 2 a stronger competitor in market B.
To close this discussion, it is worth stressing a couple of points. First, the conditions identied
in Proposition 5(b) in short, lowand non-increasing pass-through are only grossly su¢ cient
for a weakened strategic e¤ect, and hence the result of Proposition 6. The conclusions also go
through as long as these conditions hold for a su¢ ciently large portion of the interval [0; 00]
but not everywhere so demand could be convex in some places. Proposition 5(a) makes this
statement precise. Second, it is also true that there are counterexamples. In such cases, the
demand shift would strengthen the strategic e¤ect, and the result of Proposition 6 would ip.
The discussion below suggests that these are less likely in the case of the global gas market.
Third, it is clear that the multimarket rm has a very strong incentive to raise its value capture
in market A, as this also forties its competitive position in market B.
Comparing short- and long-term responses. Propositions 4 and 6 identify similarities and
di¤erences between the short-run and long-run multimarket e¤ects of the demand shock Table
1 gives a summary.
Table 1: Spillover e¤ects from higher demand in market A onto market B
Price Single-market
level rm 2s market share
Short run + +
Long run
(
strategic e¤ect weakens
strategic e¤ect strengthens
+


+
In general, the comparison between short- and long-term spillovers depends on the ne details
of the market environment. In any case, the short- and long-term are always di¤erent, either in
terms of the impact on buyers or the rivalry between rms in market B.
Consider the case where the strategic e¤ect weakens. In the short term, by Proposition 4,
rm 1 cedes market share as it redirects capacity to market A. However, in the longer term,
this is reversed: rm 1 invests in additional capacity to the extent that it gains share in market
B. The similarity is that buyers in market B always lose out yet for di¤erent reasons. In the
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short term, sales are diverted to market A; in the long term, buyers lose because the competitive
intensity in their market declines. Buyers in market A still have a higher WTP than before, but
this extra demand is now satised by rm 1s newly installed capacity.
7 Applying the results to international gas markets
This section shows how the preceding results can help understand competitive dynamics, and
inform public policy, in the global gas industry.
7.1 Application of the model to global gas
The above model is an abstraction of competitive dynamics in global gas markets, as outlined
in the Section 2. Think of market A as the Asian gas market with Japan and South Korea in
mind especially and market B as Europe. Firm 1 is an LNG exporter, such as Qatar, serving
both markets. Firm 2 is a pipeline seller, such as Russia/Gazprom, focused on the European
market. This papers focus on the balance of power between Russia and Qatar as the key
suppliers is consistent with industry analysis (Stern and Rogers, 2014).
Other modelling assumptions reect market conditions in global gas. Importantly, the setup
allows LNG and pipeline producers to have di¤erent cost structures, both in terms of production
and investment. It assumes that Qatar has identical sales costs for the European and Asian
markets; this is a reasonable assumption since, as noted in Section 2, transport costs are indeed
very similar in practice.
There is no price arbitrage between markets A and B by third-party traders. While price
di¤erentials between markets are not essential for the the model to work, as noted in Section
5, the equilibrium may thus feature price di¤erentials resulting from price discrimination by
producers, which is in line with experience in global gas markets (see Figure 1).
Firmschoices in Stage 1 can be interpreted as investments in production capacity; more
generally, these reect any kind of longer-term decisions, such as maintenance expenditure or
procurement/chartering of other parts of infrastructure, which occur before short-run sales.
Finally, the assumption that rms sell up to capacity in Stage 2 seems reasonable for the natural
gas industry (in which any capacity that is operational is typically also fully used, subject to
planned outages).17
7.2 Pipeline gas vs LNG: Competitive balance, energy security, and the
optimal import mix
Proposition 1 formalizes the idea that pipeline gas due to its physical asset specicity has
a strategic advantage over LNG in common export markets. This suggests that Russia enjoys
17The application to gas markets is admittedly stylized in other respects. This includes the absence of in-
tertemporal considerations on resource extraction à la Hotelling (sell today, or leave in the ground and perhaps
sell tomorrow), as well as gas storage. Furthermore, the capacity investments made by producers are not exactly
simultaneous in practice; for example, Russian pipelines in many cases preceded the LNG investments of other
players. The paper also follows the large-scale models of gas markets in abstracting from the details of contracting
arrangements between buyers and sellers.
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two sources of competitive advantage over Qatar in the European market. First, it is likely true
that it has lower overall unit costs (IEA, 2009: 481485), leading to a standard e¢ ciency-based
advantage. Second, magnifying the cost argument by the supermodularity logic of Proposition
2 it enjoys the strategic advantage identied here.
In contrast to many energy policy discussions, the analysis here suggests that Gazproms
dependency on the European market, because of its strategic commitment value, may be a
source of strength rather than a weakness, as is usually claimed in policy discussions. More-
over, European gas customers actually benet from Gazprom having a high market share (for a
given number of rms competing in the market) because this goes hand-in-hand with tougher
competition overall.
This highlights a limitation to the common practice of using Herndahl concentration indices
as an inverse measure of security of supply in energy markets (e.g., European Commission,
2014).18 Here, as long as Gazprom has a larger market share, a stronger strategic e¤ect raises
the Herndahl index (Proposition 3). But this makes European gas buyers better o¤ with
greater consumption at a lower price. So, in some cases, a higher Herndahl index could be good
for energy security. (Of course, the present model does not capture all relevant issues; the more
modest objective is to point out a consideration that goes against the conventional wisdom
on energy security.)
Conversely, the result can help explain why European gas-importing countries seem to place
a lot emphasis on the benets of having access to LNG supplies. It shows how an individual
gas-importing country is better o¤ with an import mix of one each of pipeline and LNG supply
than it would be with two dedicated pipeline suppliers (all with identical unit costs, for a clean
comparison). (The latter would simply boil down to standard Cournot-Nash competition with
  0.) The reason is that the LNG exporter creates an additional competitive externality on
the pipeline supplier, making it compete more aggressively and thus lowering price.
Finally, the analysis also suggests that diversication of a traditionally pipeline-based ex-
porter into LNG (from the same gas elds) comes at a strategic cost. So it can be rational for
a pipeline seller to reject apparently protable diversication to protect its existing business.
7.3 How did the Fukushima nuclear accident a¤ect Gazprom and the Euro-
pean gas market?
The Fukushima Daiichi accident of March 2011 led to a large-scale shutdown of Japanese nuclear
reactors. This sharply raised the demand for substitute energy sources, with LNG imports rising
by around 25% (GIIGNL, 2013) while prices increased by over 50% in the course of the following
year (IMF, 2014). What were its globalrepercussions in particular, what are the knock-on
e¤ects for the European market?
This response of the Japanese energy sector to Fukushima gives an opportunity to calibrate
(unobserved) demand parameters. First, this event no doubt qualied as a large shift in Japans
18There are many di¤erent denitions of security of supply. A reasonably representative one is the availability
of su¢ cient supplies at a¤ordable prices(Yergin, 2006). While this denition is also imprecise, note that it has
similarities with (expected) consumer surplus.
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LNG import demand. Second, the market response suggests that its impact on buyersWTP
satises the conditions of Lemma 4, in terms of A and 
A (equivalently, A and vA).
Third, the conditions underlying Proposition 6 a weaker strategic e¤ect seem plausible for
the case of Asian LNG imports, especially by Japan. It is commonly assumed in the analysis of
natural gas markets that demand curves are concave (e.g., Doane, McAfee, Nayyar and Williams,
2008). The argument, applied to LNG, goes as follows: At very high prices, buyers will prefer
to access substitute sources of energy, such as those linked to oil or coal prices. It follows that,
at high prices, the demand curve for LNG imports is almost at. Conversely, the amount of
LNG imports is constrained by the availability of regasication terminals (which are needed to
allow consumption). In practice, therefore, the existing regasication capacity places a cap on
the feasible import quantity. In other words, the e¤ectivedemand curve for LNG is essentially
vertical in the vicinity of the cap. Taken together, this suggests a concave shape of the LNG
import demand curve.
Importantly, the presence of such a concave demand curve means that LNG exporters en-
joy signicant pricing power in market A, which again seems consistent with recent market
experience in Asian LNG. In the present model, if consumersmaximum WTP is greater in
Asia, pA(0)  , and Gazproms long-run marginal cost is less than that of Qatari LNG,
r2 + c2  r1 + c1, then the price in Asia exceed that in Europe, bpA > bpB, consistent with
empirical observation. (Then demand conditions are more tilted towards the seller in market A,
and, of course, there is an additional seller in market B.)
Thus, in the short-term, Fukushima further improved Russias position in Europe whilst
hurting European gas buyers (Proposition 4) while, in the longer run, it made Qatar a stronger
competitor for Russia (Proposition 6).
7.4 Testable predictions and some empirical evidence
The modelling has generated a number of results that are potentially empirically testable. A rst
prediction is the advantage of pipeline sellers over LNG exporters in common export markets.
A second prediction is that a superior cost base and the single-market focus of a pipeline seller
are complementary. A third set of predictions is on the cross-market spillovers of Fukushima,
in the short versus the long run.
An important constraint is the limited quality of public data on the global gas industry. In
particular, even basic information on LNG production volumes and trade is only available at an
annual frequency. This makes di¢ cult any econometric analysis, especially around particular
market events. The remainder of the discussion here presents some preliminary evidence on the
third set of predictions.
The limited evidence that is available is broadly consistent with the above results. The
Fukushima accident happened on 11 March 2011. No other large market events appear to
have occurred around those days; Fukushima can be assumed to have dominated the news.
The short-term prediction from Proposition 4 is that both Asian and European prices rise in
the short-run, so Fukushima also makes European gas buyers worse o¤ from which Gazprom
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stood to gain.
Table 2 shows the Platts JKM (Japan Korea Marker) LNG price and the European gas
price NBP (the UKs National Balancing Point) around the days of the Fukushima accident.
Consistent with Lemma 4, the Asian LNG price rose sharply, by over 20%, over four trading
days following Fukushima. However, the European gas price also rose by almost 13%. Although
this nding is not overly surprising, it does conrm that the supply-side link between regional
markets due to global LNG capacities plays an important role in practice. Moreover, LNG
imports to Europe peaked in the Spring of 2011 and pipeline imports, especially from Russia,
subsequently rose (Stern and Rogers, 2014).
Table 2: Asian LNG prices (JKM) and European gas prices (NBP)
around the Fukushima accident (11 March 2011) in US$/MMbtu
10 Mar 11 Mar 14 Mar 15 Mar 16 Mar % change
Asia 9.40 9.90 11.00 10.95 11.35 +20.7%
Europe 9.30 9.60 10.20 10.50 10.50 +12.9%
Source: Platts data and authors own calculations
Testing the longer-term predictions the continuation of a higher European gas price,
greater LNG capacity investment, and Gazprom ultimately losing market share (Proposition
6) is more di¢ cult. First, while 11 of 53 nuclear reactors shut down on the day of the accident,
Japanese policymakers closed virtually the entire nuclear eet over the following 12 months, so
the event itself was drawn out.19 Second, many other factors vary over time. Third, the
observed market response should reect a transition from short-run impacts to the longer term;
all else equal, this is predicted to be a rise in Gazproms market share, followed by a decline to
a level below that of the status quo ante.
Investment in LNG infrastructure has indeed risen strongly since 2011 (GIIGNL, 2013), and
Gazprom is widely seen to have come under pressure in Europe (Stern and Rogers, 2014). While
there is anecdotal evidence from industry discussions that the large recent LNG investments in
the US and Australia were incentivized by global price di¤erentials, the extent to which these
developments have indeed been driven by Fukushima is yet to be tested. With better data,
future research may be able to test this econometrically.
There is ample scope for more careful empirical work on natural gas markets; the analysis
here is clearly only a small rst step. The model presented here could also be used to examine
other cross-market impacts such as how the future entry of US LNG into Asia (market A) would
a¤ect competition in Europe (market B).
19As of late 2015, Japans nuclear eet has yet to restart, so the impact of Fukushima now stretches out over
four-and-a-half years.
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8 Conclusion
This paper has studied a model of imperfect competition with strategic investments in which a
multimarket rms global capacity choice indirectly connects otherwise separate markets while
its rivals capacity investment is specic to a single market.
A single-market focus confers strategic benets similar to those associated with a rst-mover
advantage in the classic Stackelberg model. This can be a large source of competitive advantage
for a rm even in the absence of providing greater value to buyers or having lower costs. More-
over, a superior cost structure and a sharper organizational focus are self-enforcing in generating
competitive advantage. The game-theoretic approach identies and makes precise this comple-
mentarity between low costs and a narrow focus. This nding establishes a novel connection
between two of Porters generic strategies.
The degree of this strategic advantage is also intimately linked to competitive conditions in
the multimarket rms other markets. Motivated by the global repercussions of the Fukushima
nuclear accident in Japan, the paper studied the impact on the common market of a demand
boom elsewhere. Short- and long-term impacts are necessarily di¤erent, and depend on the ne
details of the competitive environment. A general conclusion is that greater value capture in its
other markets can help a multimarket rm regain market share from a more focused rival.
The application to the global gas industry motivated the presence of di¤erent organizational
structures, the role of imperfect competition, and the commitment value of large-scale infrastruc-
ture investments. Intuitions about pass-through and demand conditions in natural gas markets
were helpful for calibrating parameter conditions obtained from the model, and generated some
empirically testable predictions. The interplay between multimarket competition and strategic
commitment may also take on an important role in other sectors such as airlines.
References
Arie, Guy, Sarit Markovic and Mauricio Varela (2015). The Competitive E¤ect of Multimarket
Contact. Working Paper at Simon School of Business, University of Rochester, April 2015.
Bagnoli, Mark and Ted Bergstrom (2005). Log-Concave Probability and its Applications. Eco-
nomic Theory 26, 445469.
Bernheim, B. Douglas and Michael D. Whinston (1990). Multimarket Contact and Collusive
Behavior. RAND Journal of Economics 21, 126.
Besanko, David, David Dranove and Mark Shanley (2001). Exploiting a Cost Advantage and
Coping with a Cost Disadvantage. Management Science 41, 221235.
Bimpikis, Kostas, Shayan Ehsaniy and Rahmi Ilkiliç (2014). Cournot Competition in Networked
Markets. Working Paper at Stanford University.
Brandenburger, Adam M. and Harborne W. Stuart Jr. (1996). Value-Based Business Strategy.
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 5, 524.
26
Bresnahan, Timothy and Jonathan Levin (2012). Vertical Integration and Market Structure.
In: Robert Gibbons and John Roberts (eds.), Handbook of Organizational Economics, 853890.
Princeton University Press.
Brito, Dagobert L. and Peter R. Hartley (2007). Expectations and the Evolving World Gas
Market. Energy Journal 28, 124.
Bulow, Jeremy I., John D. Geanakoplos and Paul D. Klemperer (1985). Multimarket Oligopoly:
Strategic Substitutes and Complements. Journal of Political Economy 93, 488511.
Campa, Jose Manuel and Simi Kedia (2002). Explaining the Diversication Discount. Journal
of Finance 57, 17311762.
Carvalho, Vasco M. (2014). From Micro to Macro via Production Networks. Journal of Economic
Perspectives 28, 2348.
Chatain, Olivier and Peter Zemsky (2011). Value Creation and Value Capture With Frictions.
Strategic Management Journal 32, 12061231.
Chyong, Chi Kong and Benjamin F. Hobbs (2014). Strategic Eurasian Natural Gas Market
Model for Energy Security and Policy Analysis: Formulation and Application to South Stream.
Energy Economics 44, 198211.
Cooper, Thomas E. (1989). Indirect Competition with Spatial Product Di¤erentiation. Journal
of Industrial Economics 37, 241257.
Dixit, Avinash (1980). The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence. Economic Journal 90,
95106.
Doane, Michael J., R. Preston McAfee, Ashish Nayyar and Michael A. Williams (2008). Inter-
preting Concentration Indices in the Secondary Market for Natural Gas Transportation: The
Implication of Pipeline Residual Rights. Energy Economics 30, 807817.
Elliott, Matthew (2014). Ine¢ ciencies in Networked Markets. American Economic Journal: Mi-
croeconomics, forthcoming.
European Commission (2014). In-Depth Study of European Energy Security. Commission Sta¤
Working Document, SWD(2014) 330 nal/3, May 2014.
Gans, Joshua and Michael Ryall (2015). Value Capture Theory: A Strategic Management Re-
view. Working Paper at Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, September 2015.
Ghemawat, Pankaj (1991). Commitment: The Dynamic of Strategy. The Free Press, New York.
Ghemawat, Pankaj and Patricio del Sol (1998). Commitment versus Flexibility. California Man-
agement Review 40, 2642.
27
Growitsch, Christian, Harald Hecking and Timo Panke (2014). Supply Disruptions and Regional
Price E¤ects in a Spatial Oligopoly An Application to the Global Gas Market. Review of
International Economics 22, 944975.
Hausman, Catherine and Ryan Kellogg (2015). Welfare and Distributional Implications of Shale
Gas. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, forthcoming.
Hawk, Ashton, Gonçalo Pacheco-de-Almeida and Bernard Yeung (2013). Fast-Mover Advan-
tages: Speed Capabilities and Entry into the Emerging Submarket of Atlantic Basin LNG.
Strategic Management Journal 34, 15311550.
Holz, Franziska, Christian von Hirschhausen and Claudia Kemfert (2008). A Strategic Model of
European Gas Supply (GASMOD). Energy Economics 30, 766788.
Hubert, Franz and Svetlana Ikonnikova (2011). Investment Options and Bargaining Power in
the Eurasian Supply Chain for Natural Gas. Journal of Industrial Economics 59, 85116.
Ikonnikova, Svetlana and Gijsbert T.J. Zwart (2014). Trade Quotas and Buyer Power, with an
Application to the EU Natural Gas Market. Journal of the European Economic Association 12,
177199.
Kuppuswamy, Venkat and Belén Villalonga (2015). Does Diversication Create Value in the
Presence of External Financing Constraints? Evidence from the 20072009 Financial Crisis.
Management Science, forthcoming.
Jensen, James T. (2004). The Development of a Global LNG Market. Oxford University Press.
Joskow, Paul L. (2013). Natural Gas: From Shortages to Abundance in the United States.
American Economic Review P&P 103, 338343.
Lang, Larry H.P. and René M. Stulz (1994). Tobins q, Corporate Diversication, and Firm
Performance. Journal of Political Economy 102, 12481280.
Li, Raymond, Roselyne Joyeux and Ronald D. Ripple (2014). International Natural Gas Market
Integration. Energy Journal 35, 159179.
Makholm, Je¤ D. (2012). The Political Economy of Pipelines: A Century of Comparative Insti-
tutional Development. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Meyer, Margaret, Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1992). Organizational Prospects, Inuence
Costs, and Ownership Changes. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 1, 935.
Morgan, John and Felix Várdy (2013). The Fragility of Commitment. Management Science 59,
13441353.
Petaraf, Margaret A. (1993). The Cornerstones of Competitive Advantage: A Resource-Based
View. Strategic Management Journal 14, 179191.
28
Porter, Michael E. (1980). Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Com-
petitors. The Free Press, New York.
Porter, Michael E. (1985). Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Perfor-
mance. The Free Press, New York.
Porter, Michael E. (1996). What is Strategy? Harvard Business Review, November-December,
6178.
Ritz, Robert A. (2014). Price Discrimination and Limits to Arbitrage: An Analysis of Global
LNG Markets. Energy Economics 45, 324332.
Shelegia, Sandro (2012). Is the Competitor of My Competitor Also My Competitor? Journal of
Economics & Management Strategy 21, 927963.
Spence, A. Michael (1977). Entry, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing. Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics 10, 119.
Stern, Jonathan and Howard V. Rogers (2014). The Dynamics of a Liberalised European Gas
Market: Key Determinants of Hub Prices, and Roles and Risks of Major Players. Oxford Insti-
tute for Energy Studies NG94, December 2014.
Vives, Xavier (2000). Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools. MIT Press.
Wernerfelt, Birger (1984). A Resource-based View of the Firm. Strategic Management Journal
5, 171180.
Weyl, E. Glen and Michal Fabinger (2013). Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: Principles of
Incidence under Imperfect Competition. Journal of Political Economy 121, 528583.
Williamson, Oliver (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. MIT Press.
Yergin, Daniel (2006). Ensuring Energy Security. Foreign A¤airs 85, 6982.
References on international natural gas markets
BP (2014). Statistical Review of World Energy 2014. BP plc, London, UK.
GIIGNL (2013). Annual Report: The LNG Industry in 2013. The International Group of
Liqueed Natural Gas Importers, Paris, France.
IEA (2009). World Energy Outlook 2009. International Energy Agency, Paris, France.
IGU (2013). World LNG Report 2013 Edition. International Gas Union, Norway.
IMF (2014). World Economic Outlook (October 2014), International Monetary Fund, Washing-
ton DC.
29
Appendix
This Appendix gives proofs of Lemmas 1, 2 and 4 as well as Propositions 1 to 5. Lemma 3 and
Proposition 6 follow directly from arguments given in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 1 (Equilibrium of the game). Begin by deriving the equilibrium values
( bK; bx1; by1; by2), and then determine conditions which ensure that the equilibrium is indeed valid.
From the above discussion, the two remaining unknowns (y1;K2) are pinned down by two
equilibrium conditions. The rst follows from rm 1 equalizing marginal revenues across markets,
MRA1 (K1   y1)   MRB1 (y1;K2) = 0, by (1). Using the linearity of demand in market B,
and recalling from (3) that, by prot-maximization in market A, MRA1 = r1 + c1, and some
rearranging gives:
y1 =
(  r1   c1   K2)
2
(7)
The second follows from prot-maximization by rm 2 at Stage 1, recognizing the strategic e¤ect
of its capacity choice, MRB2 + y2 = r2 + c2, from (5):
K2 =
(  r2   c2   y1)
 (2  ) (8)
Solving these two equations simultaneously yields:
y1 =
(  r1   c1)
2
  (  r2   c2   y1)
2 (2  ) (9)
=) by1 = [(2  ) (  r1   c1)  (  r2   c2)]
(3  2) (10)
K2 =
[(  r2   c2)  [(2  ) (  r1   c1)  (  r2   c2)] =(3  2)]
 (2  ) (11)
=) bK2 = [2 (  r2   c2)  (  r1   c1)]
(3  2) (12)
The equilibrium value of the strategic e¤ect  is dened (implicitly) by (6), evaluated at the
equilibrium output in market A. The remaining equilibrium choices follow immediately frombK1 = bx1 + by1 and by2 = bK2.
Conrming this as a valid solution requires two more steps. First, nding conditions for
this to be an interior equilibrium in which both rms sell strictly positive amounts to market
B. Second, verifying that both rms indeed nd it optimal to fully use their installed capacity.
These conditions are now derived so as to hold for any possible value of the strategic e¤ect
 2 (0; 12).
Step 1 : For rm 1, note that by1 is strictly decreasing in the strategic e¤ect . It follows that,
rm 1s output to market B satises by1 > 32 (  r1   c1)  (  r2   c2) =2, for any value of
, so that:
3
2 (  r1   c1) > (  r2   c2) =) by1 > 0: (13)
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This condition can be rearranged as (r1 + c1) < 13 [+ 2 (r2 + c2)]. For rm 2, by inspection, a
necessary and su¢ cient condition for positive output is:
2 (  r2   c2) > (  r1   c1)() by2 > 0: (14)
This condition can also be written as (r1 + c1) > [2 (r2 + c2)  ].
Step 2 : Firm 1 will fully utilize all of its installed capacity as long as this is prot-maximizing,
i.e., where the marginal revenue generated from sales exceeds the associated costs. Recalling that
rm 1 chooses capacity such that MRA1 = MR
B
1 = r1 + c1, it follows that MR
A
1 = MR
B
1 > c1
(since, by assumption, r1 > 0). Thus bx1 + by1 = bK1 is indeed optimal.
For rm 2, it similarly must be veried that MRB2 (by1; by2) > c2, with its marginal revenue
evaluated at the equilibrium outputs to market B. Noting that MRB2 (by1; by2) =   by1  2by2,
and using the expressions for outputs from above shows that:
(  c2) > 3 (  r2   c2)   (  r1   c1)
(3  2) ()MR
B
2 (by1; by2) > c2: (15)
This condition can be rearranged as  (  2c2 + r1 + c1) < 3r2, which is more di¢ cult to satisfy
for higher values of the strategic e¤ect  (since  2c2+c1 > 0 is assumed). Thus letting  = 12 ,
and some further manipulation shows that
(r1 + c1) < [2 (3r2 + c2)  ] =)MRB2 (by1; by2) > c2; (16)
regardless of the value of . Thus by2 = bK2 is indeed optimal. The three parameter conditions
obtained can be combined into a single condition:
(r1 + c1) 2
 
[2 (r2 + c2)  ] ;min

1
3 [+ 2 (r2 + c2)] ; [2 (3r2 + c2)  ]
	
;
thus completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1 (Competitive advantage of rm 2). Using Lemma 1 gives an expression
for rmsrelative market shares:
2  by2by1 = [2 (  r2   c2)  (  r1   c1)][(2  ) (  r1   c1)  (  r2   c2)] = (2'2='1   1)[(2  )  '2='1] , (17)
where 'j  (  rj   cj) for j = 1; 2. Rearranging this expression shows that 2 > 1 ()
3'2='1 > (3  ), from which the claims follow immediately.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Comparative statics of the strategic e¤ect). It follows from Lemma
1, by inspection, that by1 falls with  while by2 rises with , so that rm 2s market share
rises with . Firm 2s equilibrium prots are RB2 (by1; by2)   (r2 + c2)by2 = (1   )(by2)2, since
MRB2 + y2 = bpB   (1  )by2 = r2 + c2 by (5), and are easily checked to rise with  2 (0; 12).
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Using Lemma 1, equilibrium outputs by both rms in market B satisfy
by1 + by2 = [(1 + )'1 + '2]
(3  2) : (18)
Total output rises with , so the price bpB falls with  as claimed. Firm 1s equilibrium prots
from market B are RB1 (by1; by2)  (r1 + c1)by1 = (by1)2, since MRB1 = bpB   by1 = r1 + c1 by (3),
and decline with  since by1 falls with . Let rm js market share sj  yj=(y1 + y2) so the
Herndahl index H  Pj s2j can, at equilibrium, be written as H() = 1   2bs2()[1   bs2()].
Di¤erentiation gives H 0() =  bs02()[1   2bs2()], so since bs02() > 0 by the previous argument,
H 0() > 0() bs2() > 12 () 2 > 1, yielding the result.
Proof of Proposition 3 (Complementarity in competitive advantage). The expression for
relative market shares 2  by2=by1 from (17) is, by inspection, increasing in '2='1 and ,
respectively. Di¤erentiating with respect to  gives:
@2
@
=
(2'2='1   1)
[(2  )  '2='1]2
> 0, (19)
which is positive because '2='1 >
1
2 follows from the parameter condition of Lemma 1 (where
it is necessary for rm 2 to be active). Di¤erentiating again shows that:
@22
@@('2='1)
=
2 [(2  )  '2='1] + 2 (2'2='1   1)
[(2  )  '2='1]3
=
2 (1  + '2='1)
[(2  )  '2='1]3
> 0, (20)
which is also positive since  2 (0; 12) by Lemma 1. This positive cross-partial here means that
2 is supermodular in ('2='1; ).
Proof of Lemma 2 (Pass-through and value capture). The cost pass-through rate A 
dbpA=dMC = 1=(2  A) in a monopoly market is a standard result which follows from its rst-
order condition (3). It satises A 2 (0; 1) due to the assumption that demand is log-concave,
A < 1. Think of the equilibrium price in market A as bpA(MC), with corresponding optimal
output bx1(MC), and write consumer surplus bSA = R bx10 pA(z)  bpA dz and rm 1s optimal
prots bA1 = [bpA(MC)  MC]bx1. Now consider the thought experiment of a small increase in
MC, which results in a small decrease in output, dbx1=dMC < 0, at equilibrium (since pass-
through is positive and demand is downward-sloping). This a¤ects consumer surplus according
to dbSA=dMC =  (dbpA=dMC)bx1 =  Abx1. By the envelope theorem, prots change only by
the direct e¤ect, dbA1 =dMC =  bx1. Hence the total value, i.e., the sum of consumer surplus
and rm prots, created by the last unit of output at equilibrium is (dbSA=dMC)=(dbx1=dMC) +
(dbA1 =dMC)=(dbx1=dMC), and the fraction of this total value that is captured by the rm is
dbA1 =(dbSA + dbA1 ) = 1=(1 + A), as claimed.
Proof of Lemma 4 (Demand shift). The equilibrium in market A is dened by rm 1s rst-
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order condition MRA1 (bx1) = r1 + c1 from (3). For part (a), di¤erentiation gives the impact of a
small demand increase on output:
dbx1
d
=
pA + x1p
A
x
  (2pAx + x1pAxx)

x1=bx1 =
pA (1 + 
A
 )
( pAx )(2  A)

x1=bx1 ; (21)
using the denitions of A and 
A. The denominator is strictly positive by the maintained
assumption that demand is log-concave, B < 1. The change in output due to a demand shift
from 0 to 00 is given by
bx1(00)  bx1(0) = R 000 hdbx1d ()i d, leading to the rst result. Using
(21), the impact of a small demand increase on the equilibrium price is:
dbpA1
d
= pA + p
A
x
dbx1
d
= pA  
pA + x1p
A
x
(2  A) =
pA

(1  A)  A

(2  A) ; (22)
again with all terms evaluated at x1 = bx1 (). The result follows from bpA1 (00)  bpB1 (0) =R 00
0
h
dbpA1
d ()
i
d. For part (b), on the output side, the su¢ cient condition A > 1 for all  2
[0; 00] =) bx1(00) > bx1(0) is immediate. On the price side, the su¢ cient condition A <
(1  A)=A for all  2 [0; 00] follows since A = 2  1=A.
Proof of Proposition 4 (Short-run impacts). The initial equilibrium is bx1(0)+by1(0) = bK1 andby2(0) = bK2 by Lemma 1. Begin with the optimal strategy for rm 2 following the demand shift to
00. It maximizes short-run prots maxy2

RB2 (y1; y2)  c2y2
	
subject to the capacity constraint
y2  bK2. Its marginal prot from an additional unit of output thus equals MRB2 (y1; y2)   c2,
which does not depend directly on 00.
Previously under 0, its marginal prot wasMRB2 +y2 (r2+c2). In the initial equilibrium,
this was equal toMRB2 (by1; bK2)+ bK2 jx1=bx1(0) (r2+c2) = 0, by its rst-order condition from
(5). Recall that rm 2s capacity constraint was binding, which required MRB2 (by1; bK2)   c2 >
0() [ bK2 jx1=bx1(0)   r2] < 0 (see Lemma 1s proof).
Comparing marginal prots, MRB2 (y1; y2)  c2 MRB2 (by1; bK2)  c2 + [ bK2 jx1=bx1(0)   r2]
holds if y1  by1(0) (since y2  bK2 by its capacity constraint). In other words, it is certainly
optimal for rm 2 to again sell up to capacity at 00 whenever rm 1s output is no greater than
it was at 0.
Now consider rm 1. By Lemma 2, A >  1 for all  2 [0; 00] is equivalent to @@MRA1 (x1; ) >
0 for all  2 [0; 00]. So the shift from 0 to 00 raises MRA1 (x1; ) (given x1) but again has no
direct e¤ect on MRB1 (y1; y2).
The assumption of an interior solution implies that, taking its rivals y2 as given, rm 1
maximizes its short-term prots by equalizing marginal revenue across markets, MRA1 (x1; 
00) =
MRB1 (y1; y2). Previously under 
0, its optimal strategy was MRA1 (x1; 
0) = MRB1 (y1; y2). Since
@
@MR
A
1 (x1; ) > 0, it follows that, for any given y2, rm 1s optimal x1 is now higher than
before, while its optimal y1 is now lower (because of its capacity constraint).
The short-run equilibrium thus has ex1(00) > bx1(0) and ey1(00) < by1(0), with ex1(00) +ey1(00) = bK1, for rm 1, and ey2(00) = by2(0) = bK2 for rm 2.
Finally, conrm that it is also optimal for rm 1 to fully use its installed capacities. Firm 1s
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marginal revenues in this allocation MRA1 (ex1(00); 00) = MRB1 (ey1(00); bK2) > MRA1 (bx1(0); 0) =
MRB1 (by1(0); bK2) are both higher than before, so it is again optimal to fully use capacity.
From these results, it is immediate that rm 2s share of market B has risen, and that the
price has also increased, epB(00) = pB(ey1(00)+ey2(00)) > bpB(0) (from Lemma 1), thus completing
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5 (Demand shift and the strategic e¤ect). For part (a), write


 
00
    0 =R 00
0

0()

d and di¤erentiate () = =[2 +
  pAx ()  2  A ()] to give:
0() =
 dd
  pAx ()  2  A ()
2 + ( pAx ())
 
2  A ()2 : (23)
Consider the components of dd
  pAx ()  2  A () in turn:
d
d
  pAx () =   pAx+   pAxx dx1d
=
  pAx+   pAxx  pA + x1pAx
( pAx )
 
2  A
=
  pAx  A  pA + x1pAx 
2  Ax1 since A   pAxxx1=pAx
=   1 
2  A

A
pA
x1
+ 2pAx

=   1 
2  A pAx1  A + 2A  since A  pAxx1=pA . (24)
Next, observe that dd
 
2  A () =   ddA (). Combining these results,
d
d
  pAx ()  2  A () =  pAx1  A + 2A     pAx  ddA () ; (25)
and therefore
0() =  
0@
h
pA
x1
 
A () + 2A ()

+
  pAx  ddA ()i
2 + ( pAx ()) (2  A ())
2
1A (26)
which yields the necessary and su¢ cient condition for 
 
00

= 
 
0

+
R 00
0 [
0 ()]d    0.
For part (b), the su¢ cient conditions in terms of cost pass-through, recall that A = 2 1=A, so
A + 2A = 2(1 + 
A
 )  1=A and ddA () =   dd
 
1=A

. Then it is clear that jointly su¢ cient
for 
 
00

< 
 
0

are A < 12
 
1 + A
 1
together with dd
 
1=A
  0 () dA=d  0,
for all  2[0; 00]. Finally, A < 12 () A < 0 and A  0 () pAx  0 jointly imply
A < 12
 
1 + A
 1
.
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